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ABSTRACT
A member of any profession, it is supposed, possesses the skills, which her/his training asserts. As such, the person is liable for the exercise of 
duty within their trained capacity and culpable for negligence in its prac-
tice. In Nigeria, cases of negligence are under-reported; consequently mar-
ginal compensations are made out. If the standard of measure suitable to 
the Court is that the professional should act within the generally accepted 
practice, what becomes of the practitioner who is aware of better measures 
that the exercise of due care would demand? To what extent is the patient’s 
consent informed, valid and real? What of specific cases where a patient is 
not in the position to grant consent? 
Using the Bolam criteria, this paper argues that standard of care is rel-
ative. Arguably, a professional having specialised skill should exercise dis-
cernment concomitant with their speciality and better judgement than the 
general skill level. Furthermore, a doctor has the obligation to inform the 
patient of the risks, however small, otherwise (s) he dispossesses the patient 
of an informed choice and that such explanation must be within the limits of 
the practice among colleagues. Such cases may transcend from the domain 
of contract into torts. For example the promise of an operation different 
from the promise of success, lies within the field of tort.
In specific cases where it is impossible for the patient to give consent, 
the doctor retains the duty to do what is in the best interest of the patient. 
The Bolam test is a valid threshold in determining whether the doctor has 
acted within prescribed and expected standards to avoid negligence and 
whether such doctor is liable or not for damages. 
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1. MEDICAL LIABILITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
Roughly one in twenty five (25) patients admitted to hospital experiences harm as a result and as many as a fifth of deaths in hospital may be 
caused by something going wrong, about a quarter of these adverse events 
result from negligence. These figures are derived from the only too large pop-
ulation studies of the incidence of adverse events in hospital, both of them 
American. If they apply to Nigeria then about 3,000,000 parents a year may 
experience an adverse event while in hospital, 45,000 may die in part because 
of the event, and 75,000 cases of potential negligence may arise from hospi-
tal admissions. These numbers do not include the problems that arise from 
outpatient encounters or consultations in general practice. Clearly, few cases 
of negligence in Nigeria result in a claim and even fewer in compensation.1
This paper examines the standard of care required of medical personnel 
such as doctors, surgeons, nurses etc.; the problems of proof in medical li-
ability and common practice in the above context. We will further examine 
the duty to warn on the part of medical services providers and the issue of 
contractual negligence in this regard and the controversial issue relating to 
withdrawal of medical treatment. In our examination of the above-men-
tioned, there would be crucial engagement of relevant authorities (cases) in 
our approach.
The orthodox position in relation to common practice and special skills 
is that when a person professes to have a special skill or competence, the law 
requires that when dealing with people in the context of a calling or profes-
sion they do so with an appropriate level of competence. It has been said: 
Nobody expects the passenger on the Clapham omnibus to have 
any skill as a surgeon, a lawyer, a pilot, or a plumber, unless he is 
one; but if he professes to be one, then the law requires him to show 
such a skill as any ordinary member of the profession or calling to 
which he belongs, or claims to belong, would display.2
Thus, in Philips v William Whiteley, the Court denied a claim for dam-
ages in respect of an infection the claimant developed after having her ears 
pierced in a jewellery store.3 The claimant could expect only that they were 
pierced to the standard of reasonably competent jewellery; ear- piercing is 
1 Richard Smith, ‘The Epidemiology of Malpractice’ (1990) 301 BMJ 621.
2 WVH Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 277
3 Philips v William Whiteley (1938) 1 All ER 566, KBD
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not something, which requires a surgical level of skill.4 Generally speaking, 
a defendant cannot escape liability in negligence simply by arguing that they 
followed common practice. It is trite beyond any cavil that ‘neglect of duty 
does not cease by repetition to be neglect of duty’ as was emphasised in Bank 
of Montreal v Dominion Gresham Guarantee and Casualty Company.5
Thus, for example, in Thompson v Smiths Ship Repairers (North 
Shields) Ltd., a group of Ship builders claimed for loss of hearing as a 
consequence of their employers failing to provide sufficient (or indeed any) 
ear protection or to give the necessary advice to encourage the workers 
to wear it. They had all been working in the Shipbuilding yards since at 
least 1944.6 The defendants knew that the level of noise in their yards was 
such that there was a risk of hearing loss however there was a general ap-
athy throughout the industry about the risk. Earmuffs or protectors were 
not provided until the mid to late 1970s. However, since the mid 1960s, 
official guidance warned of such risks and effective and comfortable ear 
protections were available.
The Court held that the employers could rely only on the general practice 
of inaction within the industry until the advances of the 1960s. From then on, 
however, the dangers were well known and the defendants were in breach of 
their duty of care toward their employees for failing to provide ear protection. 
This meant that the plaintiffs/claimants were unable to claim for the full extent 
of their hearing loss. Since much it hold occurred before the defendants were in 
breach (during the period from 1944 to the mid–1960s). Thus they could recov-
er damages only for the period between the mid-1960s and when ear protection 
was finally provided. Before we discuss, the Bolam test/case, it is vital to men-
tion here that considerable deference is paid to the practices of the professions 
(particularly the medical profession) as established by expert evidence and the 
Court should not attempt to put itself into the shoes of the surgeon or other pro-
fessional person.7 This means that if it is shown that the defendant did comply 
with professional standards the Court is very likely indeed to find for him8, for: 
When the court finds a clearly established practice ‘in like circum-
stances’ – the practice weighs heavily in the scale on the size of 
4 See also Well v Cooper (1958)12 QB 265.
5 [1930] AC 639 PC
6 [1984] QB 405
7 See Sidaway v Bethlehem Royal Hospital and Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871, a case 
dealing with the giving of information to Patients.
8 Vancouver General Hospital v McDaniel (1934) 152 LT 56, 57 (Lord Alness) (methods of 
preventing infection in hospital).
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the defendant and the burden of establishing negligence, which the 
plaintiff has to discharge, is a heavy one.9
It has further been observed that where the defendant has not so com-
plied, that is not of itself negligence for “otherwise all inducement to prog-
ress ... would then be destroyed”10 and in any event a professional body 
cannot set or change the law of the land,11 but it may raise the inference of 
negligence against him and it has been held that it reverses the burden of 
proof and requires him to justify his conduct.12 It ought to be noted that 
“keeping up-to-date” is obviously a pivotal element in the attachment of a 
proper standard of care, for in most professions and trades each generation 
convicts its predecessor of ignorance and there is a steady rise in the standard 
of competence incident to them, and what is due care in one generation may 
be negligent in the next.13 This was given detailed consideration in the con-
text of an employer’s duty to guard his workers against the risk of deafness in 
Thompson v Smith Ship repairers (North Shields) Ltd as mentioned above.14
In the above mentioned case, Mustill J, based himself upon the proposi-
tion that the employer should take reasonable care to keep up-to-date with 
devices available to protect hearing but must not be blamed for failing to 
plough a lone furrow. He held that even though the availability of effective 
ear-protectors had been announced in The Lancet in 1951, the defendants 
were not in breach of their duty until the publication in 1963 of a govern-
ment pamphlet on the subject.15 It should be noted, that in a later decision 
on deafness, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, while accepting the 
9  Morms v West Hartle Pool Stewn Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 522, 579 (Lord Cohen); 
Brown v Rolls- Royce Ltd [1960] 1WLR 210; Gray v Stead [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 59. Lord 
Dunedin in Morten v Dixton (William) Ltd [1909] SC 807 said ‘where the negligence of 
the employer consists of what I may call a fault of omission, I think it absolutely necessary 
that the proof of that fault of omission should be one of two kinds- either to show that the 
thing which he did not do was a thing which was commonly done by other persons in like 
circumstances, or to show that it was a thing which was so obviously wanted that it would 
be folly into neglect to provide it’.
10 Hunter v Hanley [1955] SC 200, 206 (Lord Clyde).
11 Johnson v Bingley The Times, 28 February 1995.
12 In this regard for instance, the Statements of Standard Accounting Practice drawn up by the 
professional bodies are strong evidence of proper Standards and consequently a departure 
from them requires to be justified: Lloyd Cheyham & Co Ltd v Littlejohn & Co [1987] 
BCLC 303.
13 See, e.g. Newell v Goldenberg (1995) 6 Med.L.R.371(warnings on irreversibility of vasec-
tomy); King v Smith (1995) I.C.R.339 (instructions to window cleaner about safety).
14 [1894] QB 405.
15 See also N v UK Medical Research Council [1996] 7 Med LR 309 (failure to undertake 
thorough reappraisal of human growth hormone programme after the discovery of Creutz- 
feldt- Jacob disease risk); Amstrong v British Coal The Times, 6 December  1996; Bowman 
v Hurlands & Wolf Plc [1992] IRLR 349(vibration white finger).
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‘ploughing the lone furrow’ point, considered that the information available 
to employers justified an earlier date for the imposition of a duty and em-
phasised that it was necessary for an employer to apply his mind to matters 
of safety and not merely to react to directions or union complaints.16
In relation to the position of skilled defendants, a problem usually arises 
on “general and approved practice”, as it is often known, namely, that there 
may be no uniformity within the profession as to what is proper.17 For in-
stance, the question whether a given form of medical treatment constitutes a 
lack of due care for the patient is to be judged by reference to the ‘standard 
of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special 
skill’. The law here is clearly that the defendant is not negligent if he acts in 
accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible 
body of professional opinion skilled in the particular activity; even though 
there is a body of competent professional opinion which might adopt a 
different technique. In applying this standard to a particular defendant the 
issue may become ‘whether he is, in following that practice, doing some-
thing which no competent medical practitioner using due care would do, 
or whether, on the other hand, he is acting in accordance with a perfectly- 
‘well-recognised school of thought’.18 We will now turn our attention to the 
Bolam test as enunciated in Bolam v Friern Barnet Management Committee 
in the context of standard of care.19
2. STANDARD OF CARE
It is apposite to mention here that the Courts give wide latitude to profes-sionals, acting in their professional capacity, to determine the standards 
by which they are to be judged. The position seems to be that in cases where 
the defendant has a special skill or competence (that is, a skill that the rea-
sonable man ordinarily does not have) and the circumstances are such that 
16 Baxter v Hurland Wolf [1990] IRLR 516.
17 See the oft- quoted test in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 
582 that ‘the test is the Standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to 
have that special skill’. Note that a person who holds himself out as possessing a particular 
skill or specialism will be judged by reference to the objective standard of reasonably com-
petent person exercising that specific skill or specialism. Shakoor v Situ (t/a Eternal Health 
Co) [2000] 4 All ER 81, where a practitioner of Chinese herbal medicine was held to the 
standard of an ordinarily skilled practitioner in that particular field.
18 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957)1W.L.R.582, 585,592 (McNair J). 
Note that the direction to the jury in this case has become known as the ‘Bolam test’. See 
also Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital (1985) A.C.871; Shaw v Redbridge L.B.C (2005) 
EWCH 150 (QB).
19 (1957) 2 All ER 118, 121 (Nair J).
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they are required to exercise that skill or competence, the Courts have de-
veloped a different approach. In such cases, the actions of the defendant are 
judged against those of the ordinary skilled man professing to exercise that 
skill- this is the Bolam test.20 
In Bolam v Friern Hospital Management a patient was given elec-
tro-convulsive therapy without being given a relaxant drug and without the 
appropriate physical restraints.21 In the course of the treatment, the patient 
claimed sustained fractured hip, a possible consequence of the treatment 
about which he had not been warned. At the time, the medical profession 
held conflicting views on whether it was necessary to administer relaxant 
drugs before the procedure as a way of reducing the likelihood of injury 
and whether it was necessary to warn the patients of the risk of injury. In 
assessing the standard of care, the Court held that:
a man need not possess the highest expert skill.....it is sufficient if 
he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exer-
cising that particular art....(and acts) in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in 
that particular art.22
As such, the defendants were not in breach of their duty, as other re-
sponsible doctors would have acted in the same way. It is clear that Bolam 
applies to all professionals exercising a special skill or competence. It is 
important that the policy consideration behind the Court’s approach should 
be appreciated in relation to persons exercising special skill.23
In this regard, the following warning delivered by Denning LJ in Roe v 
Minister of Health should be borne in mind.24 He said:
20 Note however that decisions on the application of the reasonableness standard do not 
normally give rise to legal precedents binding Courts for the future. However, the appellate 
Courts have the power to overturn the judge on the inferences to be drawn from the facts 
and to make their own assessment of the various factors to be weighed in the balance. In 
this context, one should note that decisions that do not create strictly binding precedents 
may nevertheless indicate in a broad terms the kind of approach which Courts are likely 
to take in future. See Markesinis and Deakins, Tort law (6th  edn, Oxford University Press 
2008) 226.
21 (1957) QBD 582
22 ibid 586 (McNair J).
23 In relation to the position of skilled defendants, see the oft- quoted test in Bolam (n 24) that 
‘the test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that 
special skill’.
24 [1954] 2 QB 66, [1954] 2 All ER 131.
OLARINDE & CHIGBO: AN EXAMINATION OF CONTEMPORARY ISSUES RELATING TO MEDICAL LIABILITY         155
It is so easy to be wise after the event and to condemn as negligence 
that which was only a misadventure. We ought always to be on our 
guard against it, especially in cases against hospitals and doctors. 
Medical science has conferred great benefits on mankind, but these 
benefits are attended by considerable risks. Every surgical operation 
is attended by risks. We cannot take the benefits without taking the 
risks. Every advance in technique is also attended by risks. Doctors, 
like the rest of us, have to learn by experience, and experience of-
ten teaches in a hard way. Something goes wrong and shows up a 
weakness, and then it is put right ... we must not look at the 1947 
accident with 1954 spectacles.25
In Roe v Minister of Health, R was, in 1947, a patient in a hospital 
and Dr G, and anaesthetist, administered a spinal anaesthetic to him in 
preparation for a minor operation. The anaesthetic was contained in a glass 
ampoule which had been kept before use in a solution of phenol and unfor-
tunately some of the phenol had made its way through an ‘invisible crack’ 
into the ampoule.26 It thus contaminated the anaesthetic, with the result that 
R became permanently paralysed from the waist down. Dr G was aware of 
consequences of injecting phenol, and he therefore subjected the ampoule to 
a visual examination before administering the anaesthetic, but he was not 
aware of the possibility of invisible cracks. Had he been aware of this pos-
sibility, adding a powerful colouring agent to the phenol so that contamina-
tion of the anaesthetic could have been observed could have eliminated the 
danger to R. It was held that he was not negligent in not causing the phenol 
to be coloured because the risk of invisible cracks had not been drawn to the 
attention of the profession until 1951 and:
Care has to be exercised to ensure that conduct in 1947 is only 
judged in the light of knowledge, which then was or ought reason-
ably to have been possessed. In this connection the then existing 
state of medical literature must be had in mind.27 
25 ibid 137.
26 [1954]2 All ER,131; [1954] 2 QB 66.
27 [1954] 2 QB 66, 92 ( Morris LJ).
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What this means in practice however is that the then existing state of 
medical literature did not make R’s injury any less probable than it should 
have been after 1951.28 In the medical malpractice case of White House v 
Jordan, an attempt was made to hold an obstetrician liable for allegedly 
misusing the forceps during delivery and thereby injuring the infant plain-
tiff. 29 Had the Court treated the unfortunate error of the doctor as ‘negli-
gence’ it would have compensated the plaintiff by holding the doctor liable, 
and so imposed an additional burden on some hospital authority. On the 
other hand, the actual decision that the doctor had not been negligent avoid-
ed such an outcome, but left the innocent victim without redress. The point 
to be noted here in this case is that the Courts in dealing with Professional 
Standards in relation to medical practice and professionals seem to take a 
broadly pro-defendant line in medical malpractice cases. 
Thus, one argument frequently invoked is that the profession itself can 
bring sanctions to bear against inefficient doctors, and through its own in-
ternal procedures can maintain high standards more effectively than the 
Courts can. A second is the fear of ‘defensive medicine’ and the frequent 
complaints of medical professionals that the threat of legal liability and the 
cost of insurance coverage are inhibiting the development of new surgical 
techniques. The Courts have accordingly said that, in the context of medical 
negligence, a ‘mere’ error of judgement is unlikely to amount to careless, 
despite the potentially grave consequences of such an error. This is strongly 
exemplified by the case of White House v Jordan.30
Broadly, a doctor’s professional functions may be divided into three 
phases: diagnosis, advice and treatment. In performing the functions of di-
agnosis and treatment, the standard by which English law measures the 
28 Note that in rejecting the claims of the Claimants in this case, the English Court of Appeal 
held that, though it was clear in hindsight that the hospital was at fault, at the time of 
the operation neither the anaesthetist nor any of the hospital staff knew of the dangers of 
storing glass ampoules in the phenol solution. The test applied was the standard of medical 
knowledge when the accident occurred in 1974.
29 [1981]  1WLR 246.
30 [1981]1 WLR 246. The Phrase “error of judgement” is ambiguous, it may signify a failure 
to come up to the Professional Standard. See also Maynard v West Midlands Regional 
Area Health Authority (1985)1 All ER 635; Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority 
(1998) AC 232, (1997)4 All ER 771. Note that Bolitho established the important principle 
that the final determination of what was to be considered reasonable skilled practice in the 
medical field lies with the Courts, who before accepting that a particular standard medical 
practice is reasonable, have to be satisfied that the standard professional practice in ques-
tion rests on a ‘logical basis’ and is ‘defensible’. See Browne- Wilkinson (1998) A.C 232, 
241-242. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Lord Browne- Wilkinson in the same case 
also noted (at 243) that ‘it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that 
views generally held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable’. 
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doctor’s duty of care to a patient is not open to doubt. ‘The test is the 
standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that 
special skill’. These are the words of McNair J in Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee 31 approved by the House of Lords in Whitehouse 
v Jordan32 and in Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority.33 
The test is conveniently referred to as the Bolam test. In Maynard’s case, 
Lord Scarman, with whose speech the other four members of the Apellate 
Committee agreed, further cited with approval the words of Lord President 
Clyde in Hunter v Hanley:34 
 In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for 
genuine difference of opinion and one man clearly is not negligent 
merely because his conclusion differs from that of other profession-
al men...The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or 
treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved 
to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be 
guilty of if acting with ordinary care...35
The language of the Bolam test clearly requires different degree of skill 
from a specialist in his own special-field than from a general practitioner. In 
the field of neuro-surgery it would be necessary to substitute for the Lord 
President’s Phrase ‘no doctor of ordinary skill’, the phrase ‘no neuro-surgeon 
of ordinary skill’. All this is elementary and, in the light of the two recent de-
cisions of the English House of Lords36 referred to, firmly established law.37 
In Sidaway, Bethlem Royal Hospital38 the claimant was paralysed while un-
dergoing an operation on her back. There was no evidence of negligence in 
the performance of the operation, rather the claimant argued that she should 
have been told of the known (although very small) risk of paralysis and that, 
31 Bolam (n 24).
32 Whitehouse (n 32) 258 (Lord Edmund-Davies).
33 Maynard v West Midlands Regional Area Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER 635 (Lord 
Scarman).
34 (1955) SLT 213, 217.
35 Maynard (n 38).
36 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267, 277 and Maynard v West Midlands Regional 
Health Authority [1985]1 All ER 635.
37 Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643 (HL). The important 
question which this appeal before the House of Lords raises is whether the law imposes any, 
and if so, what different criterion as the measure of the medical man’s duty of care to his 
patient when giving advice with respect to a proposed course of treatment. We will discuss 
this further in subsequent parts of this paper. 
38 ibid.
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had she been told, she would not have had the operation. The majority of 
the House of Lords held that the doctor was not liable. However, the reader 
is strongly urged to pay critical attention to Lord Scarman’s dissent, arguing 
for a ‘prudent patient’ test: the Courts ‘cannot stand idly by if the profession, 
by an excess of paternalism, denies its patients real choice. In a word, the law 
will not allow the medical profession to play God’.39 Notice that Sidaway v 
Bethlem Royal Hospital has been severely criticised and, though it has not 
been overruled, other authorities such as Chester v Afshar40 appear to show 
a more generous approach to patient autonomy and greater willingness on 
the part of the Courts to recognise that doctors do not always know best.41 In 
this case, the majority of the House of Lords held that a doctor had breached 
his duty of care by not informing the patient of a very small risk, which ac-
companied the course of treatment he was suggesting. Furthermore, the law 
Lords were of the opinion that it was so important that a patient be able to 
make an informed choice about a course of treatment that they were willing 
to extend the rules on causation in order to allow her claim, ‘her right of au-
tonomy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest 
departure from traditional causation principles’.42 
Lord Diplock in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors did not 
think any distinction should be made between cases concerning the amount of 
information a medical practitioner should reveal and other aspects of a prac-
titioner’s duty. He mentioned that the criterion of the duty of care owed by a 
doctor to his patient is whether he has acted in accordance with a practice ac-
cepted as proper by ‘a body of responsible and skilled medical opinion’ and ac-
knowledged that there might be several such practices in relation to a particular 
matter. However, he underlined at a later stage that the Court must be satisfied 
by expert evidence that the body of medical opinion is a responsible one.43
39 ibid 1026.
40 [2004] 4 All ER 587(HL) (although on a different issue).
41 See also, Birch v University College Hospital NHS Trust (2008) EWHC 2237 QB, 
[2008]104 BMLR 168 QBD.
42 Chester (n 46). On the causation aspect of this case, see the relevant cases on causation like 
McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008, Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral 
services (2003) 1 AC 32, (the mesothelioma case ). Note that causation is relevant to all 
torts, although most of the decided cases are on the tort of negligence. The crucial thing to 
note in this respect is that, as previously adumbrated in this work, a connection must be 
shown between the defendant’s breach of duty and the damage suffered by the claimant. 
The language used by writers and judges to describe this problem is perplexing. For ex-
ample, it is said that a defendant is not liable unless he ‘caused’ the damage; on the other 
hand, it is said that he is not liable for all the damage he has ‘caused’. Adjectives such as 
‘legal’, ‘proximate’, or ‘remote’ do little to unravel the mysteries and conundrum relating to 
the vexed question of causation in tort law jurisprudence. See Hepple and Matthews, Tort, 
Cases and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2008) ch 6.  
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3. PROBLEMS OF PROOF
Following the Bolam test, we have seen that a professional is normally exonerated if he/she can show that their practice accorded with a sub-
stantial and respectable body of opinion in his field. Thus, he/she (a medical 
doctor) is not guilty of negligence if he/she has acted in accordance with a 
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled 
in that particular art.44 Problems of proof may arise given the possibility of 
divergent or differing profession opinion in this regard. Where profession-
al opinion is divided, it is hardly surprising that judges normally consider 
themselves in no better position than the professionals to resolve the matter. 
The position seems to be that: if one body of opinion is against a technique 
but another, which is also sizeable and respectable, is for it, the normal find-
ing is one of no negligence. 
It is more straightforward however when the defendant departed or 
rather deviated from orthodox or general practice. In the context of the 
foregoing, liability was admitted, for example, in Kray v McGrathwhen a 
‘horrific’ technique was employed to deliver a twin baby. 45 In the case of 
Kray v McGrath, the defendant suffered excruciating pain as a result of the 
negligence of the defendant obstetrician in delivering her twins. The defen-
dant’s negligence caused one of the twins to be born with severe disabilities 
and it died shortly after it was born. Note that the conduct of the defendant 
in this instant case is ‘crass’. Woof J stated that the conduct of the defendant 
was ‘wholly unacceptable’ and that he had put the plaintiff through the 
most dreadful agony.46
In Cassidy v Ministry of Health (in which the problem of proof featured 
prominently) the plaintiff lost the use of his left hand and had severe pain 
and suffering as a result of negligent treatment following an operation on 
his hand. The evidence showed a prima facie case of negligence on the part 
of persons in whose care the plaintiff was, although it was not clear wheth-
43 The ‘responsible body of medical opinion’ test is a synonym for the Bolam test. Note fur-
ther that Sidaway is generally interpreted as applying the Bolam test to the provision of 
advice to a patient on the risks associated with a medical procedure. See Lord Hope’s 
comments in Chester v Afshar [2004] 4 All ER 587; See also Deriche v Ealing Hospital 
NHS Trust [2003] EWCH 3104 QB. See also the decision of the High Court of Australia 
in Rogers v Whittaker (1992) 109A LR 625 which preferred an approach similar to that of 
Lord Scarman in Sidaway.
44 Conversely, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance with such a practice, merely 
because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view [1957] 1 WLR 582, 
587.
45 [1986]1All ER 54.
46 See also Kay’s Tutor v Ayrshire & Arran Health Board (1987)2 All ER 41.
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er this was to be imputed to one Dr Fahrni, the full-time assistant medical 
officer, or to the house surgeon, or to one of the nurses.47  
The Court of Appeal held that the hospital authority was liable. Again, 
the reader should appreciate the problems of proof in this case. It was un-
clear whether the negligence that resulted in the plaintiff’s injury was that 
of the whole-time assistant medical officer, the house surgeon, or one of the 
nurses. This did not deter the English Court of Appeal in holding the hospital 
liable to the plaintiff. All three judges felt that it was unnecessary to pinpoint 
whose negligence had caused the harm; the hospital was vicariously liable for 
the professional negligence of its staff. The reasoning of the English House of 
Lords in Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority is also quite appo-
site in respect of the problems of proof in this enclave of (the) law. 48 
Generally speaking in medical negligence claims, the patient’s actual con-
dition at the time of the negligence will often be determinative of the answer 
to the crucially important hypothetical question of what would have been the 
claimant’s position in the absence of the negligence. Hotson v East Berkshire 
Area Health Authority is an instance of this. The relevant factional question 
concerning Stephen Hotson’s condition immediately prior to the negligence 
was whether his fall from the tree had left sufficient blood vessels intact to keep 
his left femoral epiphysis alive. The answer to this question of actual fact ipso 
facto provided the answer to the vital hypothetical question; would avascular 
necrosis have been avoided if Stephen Hotson’s leg had been treated promptly? 
The answer to the first question necessarily provided the answer to 
the second question, because the second question is no more than a mirror 
image of the first. Built into the formulation of the first question was the 
answer to the second question. This is not always so. Many cases are not 
so straightforward. Sometimes it is not possible to frame factual questions 
about a patient’s condition, which are (a) susceptible of sure answer and 
also (b) determinative of the outcome for the patient. It should always be 
noted that limitations on scientific and medical knowledge do not always 
permit this to be done. Suffice it to say that there are too many uncertainties 
in this field.49 
47 [1951]1 All ER 574.
48 [1987]1 All ER 809, [1987]AC 750. 
49 See the House of Lords’ decision in Gregg v. Scott [2005] 4 All E R 812. The question in 
the ‘Gregg’ type of case concerns how the law should proceed when, a patient’s condition 
at the time of the negligence having been duly identified on the balance of probability with 
as much particularity as is reasonably possible, medical opinion is unable to say with rea-
sonable degree of certainty what the outcome would have been if the negligence had not 
occurred. 
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In Hotson’s case the claimant was a boy who broke his hip when he 
fell out of a tree. The hospital negligently failed to diagnose the fracture 
for five days. The hip joint was irreparably damaged by the loss of blood 
supply to its cartilage. The judge found that the rupture of the blood ves-
sels caused by the fall had probably made the damage inevitable but there 
was 25 per cent chance, that enough had remained intact to save the joint 
if the fracture had been diagnosed at the time. He and the Court of Ap-
peal awarded the claimant damages for loss of the 25 per cent chance 
of favourable outcome. The House of Lords unanimously reversed this 
decision. They said that the claimant had not lost a chance because, on 
the finding of fact, nothing could have been done to save the joint. The 
outcome had been determined by what happened when he fell out of the 
tree. Either he had enough surviving blood vessels or he did not. The ques-
tion had to be decided on a balance of probability and had been decided 
adversely to the claimant. 
Three cases of clinical negligence that should be of interest to the reader 
in this respect and which are House of Lords’ decisions and as such com-
mand eminent authority are no doubt Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health 
Authority, 50 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority,51 and Fairchild v Glen-
haven Funeral services Ltd.52
4. COMMON PRACTICE
It is trite and axiomatic that a person who claims to have a special skill is judged, not according to the standard of the reasonable man in the street, 
but according to the standard of the reasonable person enjoying the skill, 
50 [1987] 2 All ER 909; [1987] AC750. 
51 [1988] 1 All ER 871.
52 [1988] 1 All ER 871, [1988] AC 1074, [2002]3 All E R 305; [2003] AC 32. What these 
cases show is that, as Helen Reece points out in an illuminating and incisive article ‘Losses 
of Chances in the Law’ (1996) 59 MLR 188, the law regards the world as in principle 
bound by the laws of causality. Everything has a determinate cause, even if we do not 
know what it is. The blood- starved hip joint in Hotson’s case, the blindness in Wilsher’s 
case, the mesothelioma in Fairchilds’ case, each had its cause and it was for the plaintiff 
to prove that it was an act or omission for which the defendant was responsible. The 
narrow terms of the exception made to this principle in Fairchild’s case only serves to 
emphasise the strength of the rule. The fact that proof is rendered difficult or impossible 
because no examination was made at the time, as in Hotson’s case, or because medical 
science cannot provide the answer, as in Wilsher’s case, makes no difference. There is no 
inherent uncertainty about what caused something to happen in the past or about wheth-
er something, which happened in the past will cause something to happen in the future. 
Everything is determined by causality. What we lack is knowledge and the law deals with 
lack of knowledge by the concept of proof.
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which he claims to possess.53 Generally the same rule applies in cases of alleged 
professional negligence54 although practically it is extremely difficult to show 
that standard professional practice is negligent. This is especially so in cases 
of alleged medical negligence when medical profession appears to have been 
allowed to set its own standard of care.55 McNair J laid down the ground rules 
in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee in the following terms: 
Where you get a situation which involves the use of some special 
skill or competence then the test as to whether there has been neg-
ligence or not is not the test of the man on the top of the Clapham 
Omnibus because he has not got this special skill. The test is the 
standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to 
have that special skill.... he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted 
in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible 
body of medical men skilled in that particular art. 56
Contrasting the following two cases highlights the importance of com-
mon practice in cases of medical negligence: Clark v Maclennan,57 (overruled 
by Wilsher)58 and Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority.59 In 
Clark v Maclennan, the defendant was held to have been negligent when he 
failed to conform to the general practice. 60 On the other hand in Maynard v 
West Midlands Health Authority the defendant was able to show that he had 
followed one school of thought in preference to another.61 The English House 
of Lords held that the Court was not required to choose as between the schools 
of thought. As long as the defendant could show that he acted in accordance 
with a standard, which was accepted as proper by professional and competent 
53 But note however that compliance with common practice is good, but not conclusive ev-
idence that the defendant has not been negligent. Where there is common practice in the 
activity with regard to which the defendant is alleged to have been negligent, conformity 
with that common practice by the defendant is very good evidence that the defendant has 
not been negligent. It is not, however, conclusive evidence that the defendant has not been 
negligent because the common practice itself may be negligent. See Lloyd Bank Ltd v E R 
Savory & Co [1933] AC 201.  
54 See for example Edward Wong Finance v Johnson, Stokes & Master [1984] AC 296.
55 See Grubb [1988] C LJ 12, Contrast Jones, Textbook on Torts (3rd ed) 113 – 4. 
56 [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
57 [1983] 1 All ER 416. 
58 [1986] 3 All ER 801. 
59 [1985] 1All E R 635, 638 (Lord Scarman).
60 (1983) 1 All ER 416
61 Maynard (n 38).  
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people within his profession then the defendant would not be negligent.62
There may of course be specialities within a particular profession. In 
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Area Health Authority, it was stated 
that a ‘doctor who professes to exercise a special skill must exercise the 
ordinary skill of his speciality’63, thus, a gynaecologist may not be judged by 
the ordinary skill and standard of a general medical practitioner.64 The ap-
posite question in the above context then is; is the position of someone who 
is more knowledgeable than other professionals within his field affected by 
this greater knowledge? In Wimpey Construction UK Ltd v D V Poole, 
Webster J stated that:
The second gloss which (counsel for the claimant) sought to put 
upon the (reasonable man) test was that it is the duty of a profes-
sional man to exercise reasonable skill and care in the light of his 
actual knowledge and that the question whether he exercises rea-
sonable care cannot be answered by reference to a lesser degree of 
knowledge than he had on the grounds that the ordinary competent 
practitioner would only have had that lesser degree of knowledge. 
I accept (this) submission; but I do not regard it as a gloss upon 
the test of negligence as applied to a professional man. As it seems 
to me that test is only to be applied where the professional man 
causes damage because he lacks some knowledge or awareness. The 
test establishes the degree of knowledge or awareness, which he 
ought to have in that context. Where, however, a professional man 
has knowledge, and acts or fails to act in way which, having that 
knowledge he ought reasonably to foresee would cause damage, 
then, if the other aspects of duty are present, he would be liable in 
negligence by virtue of the direct application of Lord Atkins’ origi-
nal test in Donoghue v Stevenson.65
We are of the firm view that the above observations of the learned jus-
tice are the correct approach – as this statement of Webster J in the above 
case was applied by Kirkham J in Sandhu Menswear Company Ltd v Wool-
62 See also Penny v East Kent Health Authority The Times, 25 November 1999 (standard to 
be applied to work of cervical screener that of reasonably competent Screener exercising 
reasonable care at the time the screening took place).
63 Maynard (n 38) 638.
64 See Sidaway [1985] AC 871 and also Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 
730.
65 (1984) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 499. 
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worths Plc.66 It is beyond any uncertainty that even in dealing with common 
practice that there will of course be a higher degree of care required of a 
specialist and Consultant Gynaecologist than of a general medical doctor/ 
practitioner.67 Note further that this issue of whether ‘superior’ professionals 
should be held to a superior level of care can usually be circumvented on the 
basis that the professional in question will be held to the standard of care 
that he held himself out as exercising when engaging to undertake a task. It is 
important to note here that adherence to good professional practice involves 
keeping abreast (within reasonable limits) of developments in the field and 
evolving standards as well as applying accepted professional norms when 
developing experimental treatment.68 
5. THE DUTY TO WARN
This area of medical liability is often referred to as the law of medical consent and it has been undergoing changes in recent years. We cannot 
exhaust this area in any comprehensive manner. We will briefly examine the 
position of the law in this area examining some leading cases on the subject.
The starting point in relation to duty to warn in medical liability 
is no doubt the decision of the Canadian Court in the case of Allan v New 
Mount Sinai Hospital.69 However, it is apposite to state here that the abiding 
principle for consent was always that the consent had to be an informed one. 
Patients were to be told whatever needed to be known about a particular 
procedure in order that their consent could be valid.
Generally speaking, the question of what information was to be given 
to patients in order that they are in a position to give informed consent was 
governed by the practice of the medical profession. Medical practitioners 
were generally held to have fulfilled their legal obligation if they provid-
ed information to a patient in accordance with the practice among their 
colleagues. However, recent case law in Canada, Australia and the United 
States suggests that that principle is changing.
Generally, it is the patient, not the surgeon, who decides whether or not 
surgery will be performed, where it will be performed and by whom it will 
be performed. This was succinctly enunciated in Allan v New Mount Sinai 
66 [2006] EWHCI 299 (TCC).
67 See the dicta of Sir John Donaldson MR in Condon v Basi [1985] 2 All ER 453, 454 albeit 
in the context of sports/football match.
68 See Hepworth v Kerr (1995)6 Med LR139.
69 [1980]109 DLR (3d) 539.
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Hospital.70 Consent is a fundamental prerequisite for all medical treatment. 
Patient autonomy, respect for such autonomy and the right to information 
underpins this concept of consent.71 Patients have a right to make their own 
decisions about their medical care, basing this decision on the information 
provided to them by the health care professionals responsible. Corollary 
to this right to make their own decisions is the right to information; if that 
information is necessary to enable patients to make an informed decision. 
Informed consent is recognised as an important legal and ethical princi-
ple in health care.72 As a consequence, dissatisfaction regarding the lack of 
information given about medical treatment or failure to warn the patient 
about the medical procedure or associated risk can and does result in litiga-
tion. Right of access to information, the right to consent to medical treat-
ment and the ever constant threat of litigation therefore render it necessary 
for medical practitioners working in peri-operative environment to have a 
knowledge of and understanding of the legal requirements for a valid and 
informed consent.
In a Canadian case, Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital,73 where a wom-
an had clearly indicated that she wanted to be injected in her right arm but 
was injected by the doctor in her left arm, the Court made it clear that any 
medical procedure conducted without any written or oral consent from the 
patient will constitute an assault and battery on that patient. The Court in 
this case firmly places the responsibility on the doctor responsible to obtain 
the patient’s consent. The patient in Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital was 
successful in suing for battery.74
In the light of Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital75 and other authorities 
like Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital,76 and Chatterton v 
Gerson,77 it is generally accepted that there exists the duty to warn or more 
appropriately put, a legal and ethical onus on healthcare professionals to 
provide patients with information to enable the patient to decide whether to 
70 ibid 634, 642.
71 Barneschi et al, ‘Informed Consent to Anaesthesia’ (1988) 15 European Journal of Anaes-
thesiology 517–519; Madden, Medicine, Ethics and the Law (Butterworths 2002); White, 
‘Consent for Anaesthesia’ (2004) 30 Journal of Medical Ethics 286–290.
72 Kennedy and Grubb, Medical Law (3rd edn, OUP 2000); Madden (n 81).
73 [1980]109 DLR (3d) 536.
74 Even though the Judge placed the onus on the doctor responsible for the medical treatment 
in this case, this does not exonerate any nursing professional from the legal obligations 
regarding patient consent to treatment.
75 [1980] 109 DLR(3d) 536.
76 [1985] 1 All ER 643(HL).
77 [1981] 1All ER 257.
166          AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY: JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW AND POLICY VOL. 5 ISS. 1 (2015)
consent to medical treatment or not. Legal recognition of the competent pa-
tient’s right to consent to medical treatment is well established throughout 
the world in case law and legislation. In the American case of Schloendorff 
v Society of New York Hospital, Justice Cardozo stated that:
 
[E]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a Surgeon 
who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits 
an assault for which he is liable in damages. 78
Similarly in Sidaway v Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital79 Lord 
Bridge of Harwich in the English House of Lords dealt with the question of 
whether the law imposes any if so what different criterion as to the measure 
of the medical man’s duty of care to his patient when giving advice with 
respect to a proposed course of treatment. He stated:
… it is clearly right to recognise that a conscious and adult patient 
of sound mind is entitled to decide for himself whether or not he 
will submit to a particular course of treatment proposed by the doc-
tor, most significantly surgical treatment under general anaesthesia. 
This entitlement is the foundation of the doctrine of ‘informed con-
sent’ which has led in certain American jurisdictions to decisions 
and, in the Supreme Court of Canada, to the dictate on which the 
appellant relies, which will oust the Bolam test and substitute an 
‘objective’ test of a doctor’s duty to advice the patient of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of undergoing the treatment proposed and 
more particularly to advice the patient of the risks involved. 
In Pearce v United British Healthcare NHS Trust, the view expressed 
by Lord Bridge in Sidaway that an honest answer must be given to a specific 
request for information was repeated by Lord Woolf, emphasised that if there 
was a significant risk which would influence the judgement of a patient, then 
the normal course of action would be for the doctor to inform the patient of 
the risk.80 In Chester v Afshar,81 Lord Steyn approved the approach adopted 
78 (1914) 92 N.E. 105.
79 [1985] 2 All ER 643.
80 (1999) P IQR at P54. 
81 [2004] UKHL 1,15.
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in Pearce. In Wyatt v Curtis,82 Sedley LJ applied the approach taken in Pearce, 
stating that an obligation to disclose arose where substantial risks were at-
tached to a medical procedure, ‘irrespective of the Bolam threshold’.83 
The key thing to note in this area of law is that consent will operate 
as a defence where a doctor is sued in the above context i.e. in medical 
treatment.84  Issues relating to consent arise often in the context of medical 
treatment. A doctor in the light of the foregoing does not commit a battery 
when operating or on treating a patient if the patient has validly consented 
to the treatment. Of course, this simply prompts a second question - when 
is a patient’s consent valid? In Chatterton v Gerson85 the claimant under-
went an operation to reduce the severe pain she was experiencing from a 
postoperative scar in her right groin. Unfortunately, following the operation 
the sensation in her right leg had only temporary alleviation of the pain and 
could only move about with a stick. She claimed that her consent to the op-
eration was not valid, as she had not been informed of the risks. The court 
held that as she understood the ‘general nature of the operation’ her consent 
was ‘real’, ‘once the patient was informed in broad terms of the nature of 
the procedure which is intended, and gives her consent, that is real, and the 
cause of the action on which to base a claim for failure to go into risks and 
implications is negligence, not trespass. 
Notice that consent must be real’ in the sense of not being induced by 
fraud or misrepresentation, this does not mean that a doctor who fails to 
give a patient full information prior to an operation will necessarily be liable 
in trespass.86 His liability in negligence will depend on the Bolam test which 
as previously adumbrated asks whether his practice conformed with that of 
a respectable body of opinion within the relevant part of the medical pro-
fession, with the rider, added by the House of Lords in Sidaway v Bethlem 
Royal Hospital,87 that there might be circumstances in which the nature 
of the risks in question would dictate disclosure regardless of the normal 
practice.88 
82 (2003) EWCA Civ 1779.
83 ibid 15.
84 Consent is the most important ‘defence’ in this area of law. Consent can also be understood 
as one of the definitional elements of the trespass torts so that a battery is intended, direct 
and non- consensual contact.   
85 Chatterton (n 88). 
86 In this sense there is no requirement that consent need be ‘ informed’ (Sidaway v Bethlem 
Royal Hospital,  although cf Chester v Afshar.  
87 [1985] AC 871. 
88 Note however that the question whether defendant conformed to the necessary standard of 
care in advising the patient is separate from the question whether the patient has given his 
consent to surgery.  
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It should be appreciated that ‘justice requires that in order to vitiate the 
reality of consent there must be a greater failure of communication between 
doctor and patient than that involved in a breach of duty’ in negligence.89 In 
Chatterton v Gerson, Bristow J thought that ‘once the patient is informed 
in broad terms of the nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives 
her consent, that consent is real, and as previously mentioned, the cause of 
action on which to base a claim for failure to go the risks and implications 
is negligence, not trespass.90 It might be different, perhaps, if a surgeon, 
through error, carried a circumcision on a patient when he was meant to 
undertake a tonsillectomy.91 For sake of clarity, it is apposite that the reader 
should compare the case of Chatterton v Gerson with Sidaway especially in 
terms of the approach (decisions) of the Courts in the two cases. 
In Chatterton v Gerson, the plaintiff suffered a trapped nerve after a 
hernia operation. She went to see the defendant, who was a specialist, about 
her trapped nerve. He performed an operation to free the trapped nerve but, 
as a result of the operation, the plaintiff lost all sensation in her right leg. 
She sued the defendant in battery on the ground that she had not truly con-
sented to the operation because its effect had not been properly explained 
to her. Her claim was ejected because it was held that an action in battery 
could only succeed where her consent to the operation was not real and that 
provided the doctor had informed her in general terms of the nature of the 
operation, which he had, she had no course of action.
The House of the Lord in Sidaway held that English law did not recog-
nise the existence of the doctrine of informed consent. They held that the 
question to be asked in each case was not whether sufficient information 
had been disclosed to the plaintiff to enable her to make an informed choice 
about whether or not to undergo the operation but whether a reasonable 
doctor would have acted as the defendant had done in only relating a certain 
amount of information.92 
89 See Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1QB 432 (Bristow J). 
90 Chatterton (n 88) 432, 443. 
91 ibid.
92 The point to be noted here is that the patient’s consent to being operated on is broadly effec-
tive to protect the Surgeon in respect of the particular type of operation in issue e.g. a tonsil-
lectomy. If however, the Surgeon makes an error leading to the failure of the operation, the 
Claimant’s complaint in that regard is not that he was operated on against his will but that 
the outcome of the operation was detrimental to him. See Hills v Potter (1984) 1 WLR641; 
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital (1985) AC 871; Freeman v Home office(No2) [1984) 
QB 524. Additional protection for the Surgeon derives from the ruling in Freeman v Home 
office (No2) (1984) 1 QB 524,537 (McCowan J) 557 (Sir John Donaldson MR).
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Furthermore, in Gold v Haringey Health Authority93 the English Court 
of Appeal seemed to have tergiversated in their approach. The plaintiff un-
derwent a sterilization operation but was not told of the risk of the opera-
tion failing; nor was she told that the failure rate for sterilization was higher 
than the failure rate for a vasectomy. The sterilization was not a success 
and the plaintiff subsequently became pregnant. She brought a negligence 
action against the defendant health authority. The trial judge found for the 
plaintiff94 holding that Bolam only applied to advice given in a therapeutic 
context and that it did not apply in a non-therapeutic context. The Court 
of Appeal rejected this argument and held that Bolam applied in both con-
texts.95 Applying Bolam they held that the defendants were not liable be-
cause there was a substantial body of medical opinion, which in 1979 would 
not have warned the plaintiff of the risk of failure. Both Lloyd LJ and Ste-
phen Brown LJ relied on the judgment of Lord Diplock in Sidaway and, al-
though the Court was not asked to choose between the approaches adopted 
by Lord Diplock and Lord Bridge in Sidaway, it would seem that the former 
approach has gained approval of the Court of Appeal. However, it is un-
fortunate that the Court of Appeal did not consider the conflicting opinions 
delivered in Sidaway, and its uncritical reliance upon the judgment of Lord 
Diplock is likely to be subjected to some re-examination in the future.96 
7. CONTRACTUAL NEGLIGENCE
The Kaleidoscopic nature of tortuous/negligence liability is further 
compounded by the interplay sometimes or rather interfaces between con-
tract law and tort law. Some writers like Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston 
and Basil Markesinis have referred to this as ‘the escape out’ of contract and 
into the domain of tort.97 This contract-tort overlap has proved even more 
complicated; and wide dicta from judges have not, it is submitted, helped to 
clarify matters. In Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd,98 
Lord Scarman had tersely observed that:
93 [1988] QB 481, [1987] 2 All ER 888.
94 [1987] 1 FLR 125.
95 That Bolam is equipollent in both context is demonstrated in the approach of the Court of 
Appeal in this case.
96 See Grubb (1988) CLJ 12 and Lee (1987) 103 LQR 513. See also Devi v West Midlands 
AHA (1980) CLYB 687, Wells v Sommerset AHA  The Times, 29 July 1978, Reibl v Hughes 
(1981)114 DLR (3d) Canadian Supreme Court); Haughian v Paine (1987) 4 WWR 97 
97 Markesinis and Deakins ( n 23).
98 [1986] AC 80.
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Their Lordships [did] not believe that there [was] anything to the 
advantage of the law’s development in searching for a liability in 
tort where the parties are in a contractual relationship.99
Lord Scarman’s dicta to the effect that there is no inherent advantage of 
the development of law in searching for a liability in tort when the parties 
are in a contractual relationship may be more appropriate to commercial 
relationships but not in other areas e.g. in the context of employers liability 
towards his employees.100 It is also the position of the writers that the es-
cape out of the contract regime into tort may be justifiable in other contexts 
where what one could call ‘public policy’ arguments would not favour the 
exclusion by the law of contract of rules deriving the existing general rule. 
However, it must also be stated here that Lord Scarman’s pronouncement 
‘that their Lordships (did) not believe that there (was) anything to the advan-
tage of the law’s development in searching for a liability in tort where the 
parties are in a contractual relationship’, may carry less weight (and, thus, re-
course to the potentially more generous tort rules may be allowed) if the rela-
tionship is that of concurrent contractual and tortuous liability. This could be 
especially significant in the context of relationship between professionals and 
clients, for example, solicitors,101 doctors,102 insurance brokers103 and the like.
For the purposes of medical liability context, we will look at two lead-
ing cases in this enclave of the law. Generally a doctor’s duty in tort is to 
exercise proper professional care and skill and the implied terms in his 
contract are the same or equipollent. A doctor does not impliedly warrant 
that he will affect a cure, though theoretically he may do so by an express 
promise to that effect.104 In the case of Thake v Maurice,105 Mr Thake was a 
99 ibid 107, it has been suggested that where there is a contractual relationship between the 
parties their respective rights and duties have to be analysed wholly in contractual terms 
and not as a mixture of duties in tort and contract. Sir Nicolas Browne- Wilkinson (as he 
then was) in Johnston v Blooms bury Health Authority (1992)1 QB 33 was of the view 
that the above proposition was what the case of Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong 
Hing Bank Ltd demonstrated.
100 It has been observed that this approach in the context of employer’s liability towards his 
employees may be particularly dangerous. For, it is argued, if accepted and taken to its 
logical extremes, it could completely displace the law of employer’s liability and put their 
employees at a disadvantage that may not be acceptable to modern society. See Marke-
sinis and Deakins ( n 23 ) 27, 28.
101 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett, Slubbs & Kemp (1979) 384 (CH).
102 Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644. This is principally our concern in this part of the work. 
See also Eyre v Measday [1986]1 All ER 488.
103 Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd (No2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 431,459.
104 Thake v Maurice (n 117) shows that a Court will require pellucid clear evidence to estab-
lish such a warranty against a doctor.
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railway guard and they were not financially comfortable with five children 
already (two grown up), living within a three bedroom council house. Mrs 
Thake wanted to be sterilised, but the NHS waiting list was long and they 
could not afford to go private. Their doctor suggested Mr Thake have a 
vasectomy and arranged for them to see Mr Maurice. He did not advise 
Mrs Thake that there was a small chance that after a vasectomy there could 
be a recanalisation and Mr Thake would become fertile again. Mrs Thake 
ignored the signs of pregnancy because she thought it had worked, and they 
only realised when she was five months pregnant. She wanted an abortion, 
but it was too late. A healthy child was born called Samantha. They sued in 
contract and tort for damages.106
The English Court of Appeal held that a normal, reasonable person 
knows medical operations are not always successful, and that simply by 
promising to do an operation, there is no promise for success. Speaking 
about what an ordinary person would do, Nourse LJ said, ‘It does seem to 
me to be reasonable to credit him with the more general knowledge that in 
medical science all things, or nearly all things are uncertain’. 
All agreed that as a matter of tort, failure to warn about a small risk of 
failure amounted to a breach of duty of care between Surgeon and patient. 
The measure of tort damages were less than potential contract damages of 
£2500, being only £1500 to take account of the fact she did not have the 
pain of an abortion. But there would be no damages for breach of contract, 
to put the patient in the position as if the contract had been successful, or 
in other words, to reimburse for the expenses of bringing up the child. Kerr 
LJ concluded his judgment by referring to Lord Denning MR in Greaves & 
Co (Contractors) Ltd v Bayn ham meikle & Partners107 when he said, ‘The 
Surgeon does not warrant that he will cure the patient.’
That was said in the context of treatment or an operation designed to 
cure, not in the context of anything in the nature of an amputation. The 
105 ibid.
106 It appears from authorities that in some contexts, the common law is not antipathetic to 
concurrent liability and there is no sound basis for a rule which automatically restricts 
the claimant to either a tortuous or contractual remedy. see Henderson v Merret Syndi-
cates Ltd (1995) 2 AC 45, 93, 94. The reasoning of Oliver J(as he then was) in Midland 
Bank Trust Co (n 116) was reaffirmed and the ambit of the Scarman dicta from Tai Hing 
further circumscribed. In Henderson v Merrett Syndicate (1995) 180, the House of Lords 
held that the Hedley Byrne principle extended beyond lliability for financial harm caused 
by misstatement to cover a wider set of economic loss brought about by negligence in 
the performance of a service. According to Lord Goff, this wider principle rests upon a 
relationship between the parties, which may be general or specific to the particular trans-
action, and which may or may not be contractual in nature. 
107 [1975] 1 WLR 1095,1100.
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facts of the case are obviously extremely unusual, but I do not see why 
Surgeons should view the judge’s and my conclusion on those unusual facts 
with alarm, as mentioned by the judge. If the defendant had given his usual 
warning, the objective analysis of what he conveyed would have been quite 
different, and it is also to be noted that in the second consent referred to 
by French J in his judgment in Eyre v Measday, the wording included the 
following:
The purpose of the operation is to render me sterile and, although 
it is nearly 100 per cent successful, I appreciate that this cannot be 
guaranteed. It may not be possible to reverse the operation. 108
Accordingly, in Thake, Neil LJ noted that: 
It is the common experience of mankind that the results of medical 
treatment are to some extent unpredictable and that any treatment 
may be affected by the special characteristics of the particular pa-
tient. It has been well said “the dynamics of the human body of 
each individual are themselves individual....” The reasonable man 
would have expected the defendant to exercise all the proper skill 
and care of a Surgeon in that speciality, he would not in my view 
have expected the defendant to give a guarantee of 100 per cent 
success. So stressing that the operation ‘irreversible’ did not amount 
to giving a guarantee that it would work, no binding promise.
 The above opinion of the Court aptly summarize that the legal obliga-
tion and duty imposed on a medical doctor is not to be all-knowing or to 
guarantee the success of medical procedures. Rather, a doctor’s duty in tort 
is to exercise proper professional care and skills required for a member of 
the medical profession.
8. WITHDRAWAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENT 
The leading case on withdrawal of treatment is the case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland,109 dealing somewhat with the Court’s power to authorise 
withholding treatment or sustenance from a person in a persistent vegetative 
108 [1986] 1 All ER 488.
109 [1993] 1All ER 821.
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state.110 In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, Anthony Bland, was seriously in-
jured at the Hills borough football disaster when aged 17. As a result of his 
injuries he sustained catastrophic and irreversible brain damage, which had 
left him in a persistent vegetative state (P.V.S) with no prospect of improve-
ment or recovery. With the agreement of his family, the doctors responsi-
ble for his care sought declarations that they might lawfully discontinue 
all life-sustaining treatment and medical support measures, including the 
termination of ventilation, nutrition, and hydration by artificial means, and 
that they need not provide any medical treatment to the patient except with 
the sole purpose of enabling him to die peacefully with the greatest dignity 
and the least pain, suffering and distress.
The President of the Family Division granted the declaration sought and 
this was approved on appeal to the Court of Appeal. The official solicitor, 
representing the patient, appealed to the House of Lords. It must be stated 
here and should be appreciated with pellucid clarity that the courts in this 
case were faced not with the question whether treatment could be admin-
istered to a patient without his consent, but whether it could be withheld 
under circumstances where it was impossible to ascertain what the patient’s 
wishes were.111
The patient in this instant case sustained injuries that caused him to suffer 
brain damage, as a result of which he was unable to respond to any external 
stimuli. He had to be fed by a tube inserted into his nose and stomach, and 
medical staff, was required to take steps to ensure that he remained free of 
infections, which would otherwise have been fatal to him. In the words of the 
president of the family Division,112 ‘there is simply no possibility whatsoever 
that he has any appreciation of anything that takes place around him’. Doc-
tors treating him, who were unanimously of the opinion that he had no pros-
pect of recovery, made an application for a declaration that medical treatment 
could lawfully be withdrawn notwithstanding the patient’s inability to give 
his consent; the patient’s parents supported the application.
110 See also Frenchay NHS Trust v S (1994)1 WLR 601.
111 It is not unlawful to withhold medical treatment, including artificial feeding and the 
administration of antibiotic drugs, from an insensate patient with no hope of recovery 
when it is known that the result will be that the patient will shortly thereafter die, pro-
vided responsible and competent medical opinion is of the view that it will be in the 
patient’s best interest not to prolong his life by continuing that form of treatment because 
such continuance is futile and would not confer any benefit on him (Airedale NHS Trust 
v Bland). Note however that the  Airedale approach does not contravene the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK) and the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. See also NHS Trust A v 
M, NHS Trust B v H [2001]1 All ER 801.
112 [1993] AC 789,825 (Sir Stephen Brown P).
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There was no question in this case of applying the wardship jurisdic-
tion; the patient who was 17 when he sustained his injuries, was aged 21 
at the time the case was brought to Court. Lord Goff, giving the leading 
judgment in the House of Lords,113 said that there was no absolute rule that 
a patient’s life had to be prolonged by treatment or care regardless of all the 
circumstances; the patient’s right of self- determination, which meant that 
he could withhold consent for medical treatment, qualified the principle of 
the ‘sanctity of life’.114
It was moreover inconsistent with the principle of self-determination 
that the law should provide no means of enabling treatment to be lawfully 
withheld in a case when the patient was in no condition to indicate wheth-
er or not he consented to treatment being continued. The difficulty was 
whether the doctor could be held civilly or criminally liable for his failure 
to treat the patient. In this regard, Lord Goff considered that there was a 
fundamental difference between a case in which a doctor sought to bring life 
to an end by a positive act of commission- by, for example, administering a 
fatal overdose- and one in which he discontinued life- saving treatment. The 
latter could be accurately characterised as an omission, and could give rise 
to liability only in circumstances where the doctor was under an affirmative 
duty of action. The central question, then, concerned the precise extent and 
scope of the doctor’s duty to his patient in these circumstances. This was 
to act according to the ‘patient’s best interest’- in accordance115 with the 
Bolam’s test, subject to the need to seek the Court’s opinion by obtaining a 
declaration on an originating summons, the procedure laid down for such 
cases in Re F.116
113 Lords Keith and Lowry expressed their broad concurrence with the reasoning adopted 
by Lord Goff.
114 A principle long recognised in most, if not all, civilized societies throughout the modern 
world, as is indeed evidenced by its recognition both in article 2 of the European Conven-
tion for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms (Cmd8969, 1993) 
and in article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966; see also 
section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and article 4 of 
the African Human Rights Charter.
115 Necessity might also be invoked here in the context of the foregoing. Previously in medi-
cal situation where a Claimant is unable to consent a defendant might rely on the limited 
common law defence of necessity. This solved a practical problem experienced by emer-
gency services and other medical professionals where an unconscious patient is incapable 
of consenting to necessary medical treatment. On this basis where a Patient is uncon-
scious but otherwise competent, and not known to object to the treatment, doctors may 
intervene in the best interest of the patient (Re F, F v West Berkshire Health Authority 
(1990) 2 AC 1). It was also used in cases of permanent incapacity, for example where the 
patient is in a coma or mentally ill , Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.
116 F v West Berkshire Health Authority (1990) 2 AC1.
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The House of Lords unanimously agreed, that the declaration sought 
should be granted on the basis that it was in the patient’s best interests that the 
treatment should be discontinued. Note further that in NHS Trust v M117 the 
approach taken in Airedale NHS v Bland118 was challenged as being incom-
patible with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
which guarantees the right to life, and Article 3 of the ECHR, which guaran-
tees- freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment which would allegedly 
take place between withdrawal of feeding and death. Butler–Slossp held that a 
responsible decision by medical staff in line with Airedale NHS v Blandwould 
not amount to intentional deprivation of life contrary to Article 2 or to a vio-
lation of Article 3, if it satisfied the ‘best interest’ requirement. 119
9. CONCLUSION
Having examined the issue of professional liability with particular em-phasis on the position of doctors and other allied medical personnel/
practitioners, it is evident that the position of law in this area is in need of 
further clarity. Albeit our observation that the standard of care in respect of 
their duty of care seems to be relative in light of the authorities examined in 
this article. The duty to inform the patient of risks, for instance, is well es-
tablished as a fundamental principle of English law, indeed long established 
and now unchallengeable by judicial decision especially among surgeons. A 
surgeon owes a legal duty to a patient to warn him or her in general terms of 
possible serious risks involved in the procedure. The only qualification is that 
there may be wholly exceptional cases where objectively in the best interests 
of the patient the surgeon may be excused from giving a warning. It should 
also be noted that in modern law, medical paternalism no longer rules.
There is also no absolute rule that patients’ lives have to be prolonged 
by treatment or continuing medical care. The principle of sanctity of life is 
qualified by the patient’s right of self-determination which means they could 
withdraw consent for medical treatment. Recognising the ever-pervasive role 
of necessity in almost every aspect of human endeavours and the inherent 
defence it can afford to medical practitioners, it is our suggestion that the pa-
tient’s best interest should always remain paramount in the consideration and 
opinion of doctors in dealing with issues of medical risks raised in this article.
117 (2001) 2 FLR367.
118 ibid. 
119 ibid.
